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OUTPUT 
MEASUREMENT IN 
THE SCOTTISH 
BUDGET 
 
by Professor Arthur Midwinter, University of 
Edinburgh 
 
Introduction 
The publication of the new spending plans for Scotland 
(Scottish Executive 2004a) after the debate on Spending 
Review 2004 was greeted in journalistic and political circles 
as but the latest exercise in government spin.  The Herald's 
Scottish political correspondent (Gordon, 2004) inferred that 
the dropping of 138 targets was part of a Machiavellian 
exercise of control of information to cloud the process of 
accountability, and as greater transparency and efficiency in 
public spending was central to the rationale for targets, then 
clearly if correct, this was a major issue of public concern. 
The practice of target-setting by the Executive however, 
requires the reconsideration of targets in each Spending 
Review and their replacement as appropriate, whether by 
more relevant measures or to reflect new priorities.  In this 
case, there was no presentational spin. 
 
The New Labour version of performance measurement has 
its origins in the Clinton Administration adoption of the 
philosophy of governance advocated by Osborne and 
Gaebler (1993), known as 'Reinventing Government'. 
Performance information is now in widespread use in 
Europe and America, as "indispensable tools for improving 
management and accountability" (Forsythe, 2001), even 
though to date, there is greater evidence of the rhetoric of 
performance management than impact on resource 
allocation in reality.  Performance information was first used 
in output budgeting reforms in the 1960s, and reinvented as 
part of the Conservative approach to value-for-money in the 
Financial Management Initiative of 1982, before being 
reformed again in New Labour's Public Service Agreements 
in 1998.  The Treasury argument is that government should 
have transparent outcomes and targets, to relate inputs to 
the outputs and outcomes it seeks to achieve (Balls and 
O'Donnell, 2002). 
 
It is perhaps worth pausing for a moment to clarify the 
difference between output measurement for budgetary 
purposes, from output measurement in the national 
accounts. The latter is mainly a tool of economic analysis 
which attempts to measure economic output. This is 
problematic for the public sector, as the conventional 
approach has been to equate the value of inputs with 
outputs.  Put simply, government output is simply 
government expenditure. 
 
The Atkinson Review (2004) has grappled with this 
convention, as it assumes there is no change in productivity, 
a particularly dubious assumption in a period of rapid 
technological change.  This convention, particularly in 
conjunction with the practice of measuring growth of GDP in 
aggregate terms, (rather than per capita terms), makes the 
ongoing arguments about Scotland's poor relative economic 
performance of questionable value (MacLaren, 2003).  As 
Atkinson notes, "the design of direct output measures needs 
considerable care" (p.10).   Moreover, on crude output 
measures, decisions to improve the quality of services, e.g. 
reduced pupil/teacher ratios or patients per practice, will 
record lower output, which seems perverse if these lead to 
better outcomes. 
 
Further, in part because of devolution, the new approach to 
measuring government output developed for the national 
accounts does not apply in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland.  So with Government activity accounting for a large 
share of Scottish GDP, any comparisons on the current 
model will be open to challenge. 
 
Atkinson has recognised that there are important differences 
of objectives in measuring output for budgetary purposes. 
Although there are similar problems of definition and 
measurement, measuring performance in government is a 
more complex task than measuring economic output and 
productivity, as spending programmes are concerned with 
effectiveness and equity as well as efficiency. 
 
In Whitehall, Public Service Agreements (PSAs) formalised 
Labour’s approach into a format of aims, objectives and 
targets for each department, but also for a number of cross- 
cutting programmes.  Over the years, the number of targets 
has fallen, from 250 in 1998 to 110 in 2004, and have 
become increasingly outcome focussed.  In the most recent 
White Paper (HM Treasury 2004), the Chancellor argues 
that PSAs combine clear national goals with unprecedented 
levels of transparency, and have shifted the debate so that: 
 
"we can measure how effectively resources are 
being used and whether services are delivering the 
outcomes that will really make a difference to 
peoples' lives…… 
 
The PSAs in this document set out objectives and 
performance targets across government, 
explaining what departments plan to deliver in 
return for the continued investment in resources. 
The PSA is an integral part of a framework for 
increased clarity, devolution and accountability in 
the delivery of public services". (Foreword). 
 
 
*  Arthur Midwinter is a visiting professor in the Institute for Public Sector 
Accounting Research at the University of Edinburgh, and the Budget Adviser to 
the Scottish Parliament’s Finance Committee. 
The Spending Review Process in Scotland 
The financial arrangements for the Scottish Executive are 
largely the continuation of the pre-devolution framework as 
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adjusted by the Labour Government after 1997. This 
divides resources into the Departmental Expenditure Limit 
(DEL) which can be directly controlled rather than being 
demand-driven, and Annually Managed Expenditure (AME), 
which is negotiated annually. 
 
UK Spending Reviews take place every two years, but utilise 
a three-year planning cycle, in which the last year of the 
current cycle overlaps with the first year of the new cycle 
and which is reconsidered as part of the process. The 
Spending Review is essentially concerned with allocating 
the DELs.  The Executive is only subject to Treasury control 
over the totals; financial management is a matter for 
decision in Scotland, with no requirement to follow the UK 
pattern of departmental allocations.  Moreover, the 
Executive is not subject to a Public Service Agreement with 
the Treasury, although it makes use of the 'aims-objectives 
and targets' format within the Scottish Budget.  The Scottish 
Spending Review is carried out by the Executive after its 
Departmental Expenditure Limit has been set by the UK 
Government in July. 
 
In the initial post-devolution budgets, it was argued that 
there was a "lesser emphasis on a schematic structure of 
indicators" as "the Executive has not appeared to embrace 
detailed performance and output indicators as a tool of 
planning with the same enthusiasm as in Whitehall" (Parry, 
2000, pp 3-4).  It is certainly the case that practice was 
inconsistent across departments (Flynn, 2001), but a more 
recent study reported views from within the Executive that a 
greater focus on outcomes and outputs was the driving 
force in budgetary reform (McKay and Fitzgerald, 2002). 
 
The appointment of a new Finance Minister in 2002 resulted 
in an overt commitment to push this process forward, and 
Spending Review 2002 (Scottish Executive 2002) was 
presented as an improved framework of financial and 
performance management which delivered more efficient, 
transparent public spending tightly targeted on priorities, 
and 
 
"this emphasis on making clear linkages between 
our spending and our priorities will become ever 
stronger, ensuring that our resources are focused 
more and more tightly on delivering positive 
change for the people of Scotland". 
 
(Scottish Executive 2002, p.12) 
 
Whilst in practice this aspiration remained unfulfilled, and 
problems of linking resources with results and of targeting 
priorities were highlighted by the Finance Committee (2003), 
it is nevertheless fair to observe an improvement in the 
quality of financial and performance information in the 
budget. The key issue is the scope for integrating such 
data, for the state of the art elsewhere remains limited 
(Talbot and Johnson, 2003). 
In 2004, a new Annual Evaluation Report (AER) now 
included a report on performance in meeting targets set in 
2002; a statement of the new spending priorities; and a 
summary of current expenditure plans.  It is then the subject 
of consultation over the proposed priorities with Parliament 
and public, who can submit comments to the Executive for 
consideration during the Scottish Spending Review process 
in the summer. The Draft Budget is delivered in the autumn, 
and contains the Executive's formal response to 
Parliament's budget recommendations. 
 
The 2004 Spending Review in Scotland is the third such 
exercise carried out by the Scottish Executive since 1999. 
During this period, there has been continuous real growth in 
the Departmental Expenditure Limit (DEL), of around 4.5% 
per annum.  Whilst SR 2004 reduces the rate of growth in 
real terms by around 1%, this nevertheless marks a 
continuation of the most sustained period of expenditure 
growth in modern history.  The UK Government undertook a 
Comprehensive Spending Review in 1998, and the Scottish 
Office participated in that exercise. The format adopted by 
the Scottish Executive post-devolution has its roots in 
Whitehall's FMI initiative, which recommended the setting of 
departmental "aims, objectives and targets" (Likierman, 
1987). Scottish Executive departments each produce a 
business plan with "a hierarchy of policy aims and 
programmes" and "output measures and other milestone 
indicators so that progress against the plans can be 
measured" (Audit Scotland 2002 p.20).  The objectives of 
FMI are enshrined in the memorandum to accountable 
officers of April 2002, which, amongst other responsibilities, 
seeks 
 
Æ    to ensure that managers have a clear view of their 
objectives and means to measure performance, and 
 
Æ    to ensure managers have well-defined responsibilities 
for making the best use of resources. 
 
The business plans form the basis of the budget documents, 
which include output measures and key performance targets 
(Audit Scotland 2002, p.21) 
 
The Executive argues that the Spending Review process 
has a longer-term look within a strategic framework, which 
should facilitate better targeting of resources on priorities, 
and greater transparency in reporting performance against 
targets. The difficulties of linking resources with results in 
similar approaches used elsewhere are warning signals to 
reformers, but are not acknowledged in the official 
documentation. It also introduced outcome measures 
related to health status, educational achievement, poverty 
and crime. 
 
The set of targets inherited from the Scottish Office was a 
mix of process and output-based measures, but few were 
outcome-based.  Examples include "pay Revenue Support 
Grant on time and accurately throughout the year" 
(process); and "improve 100,000 houses suffering from 
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dampness and condensation by 2003” (outputs).  A study of 
the Scottish model in 2001 which sought to assess the 
extent to which outcome measures were in use, concluded 
this was inconsistent and linking resources to results 
remained problematic (Flynn, 2001). 
 
A major improvement to the model came with Building a 
Better Scotland (Scottish Executive 2002) which set cross- 
cutting targets for the first time – for promoting equality and 
sustainability – and also increased outcome measures 
 
The Parliament's Finance Committee has been supportive in 
principle of developing outcome measures, even when 
expressing dissatisfaction with practice, and recommended 
that the Executive should rationalise and simplify the 
process in Spending Review 2004.  It reported widespread 
concern with existing practice in evidence from Subject 
Committees. One witness, Professor Irvine Lapsley, advised 
that 
 
"it is difficult to set a target, identify a programme of 
expenditure, and establish how it impacts on the 
target" (para.60); 
 
whilst Professor Peter Wood similarly observed that 
 
"the targets are not necessarily or clearly related to 
activities which represent the main elements of 
spending, or even the elements of spending which 
are being increased" (para.59), 
 
and finally, Professor David Heald advised the Committee 
 
"not to put too much emphasis on targets" but 
"regard them as a useful benchmarking exercise, 
and not as a substitute for political and managerial 
judgement" (para.60). 
 
The Committee's conclusion reflected this evidence, in 
noting that linking objectives, funding and targets was still 
problematic, and that the Executive should set targets which 
its actions could influence.  It recommended dropping 
around one-third of the 153 targets which were process- 
based in 2004. (Scottish Parliament Official Report, pp. 14- 
17). 
 
A recent study, carried out prior to Spending Review 2004, 
from an economic perspective, advocated greater use of 
cost-benefit analysis and monetary valuation of outputs 
rather than performance measurement (Crafts, 2004). This 
paper noted that socio-economic factors can influence 
performance against targets, and argued for better quality 
information.  Crafts, however, appears to confuse the 
objectives of measuring performance and measuring 
productivity.  Whilst cost-benefit analysis is in use for 
evaluating options within capital programmes, the limitations 
of the approach mean that they at best inform, and at worst 
simply legitimise, political judgements.  Using cost-benefit 
analysis or comparison across programmes is not 
widespread, and fraught with difficulty. 
 
Indeed, there is little evidence in the public domain that 
performance targets influence budget decisions, rather they 
are instruments of accountability.  Parliament and the 
Executive are considering how best to improve performance 
reporting to strengthen the scrutiny process.  In the most 
recent document, there is a greater incidence of output and 
outcome measures Outputs are more easily identified, 
recorded, and related to spending, whether in terms of 
staffing, buildings or technology. Outcomes remain 
problematic, because intervening variables influence results 
in terms of economic growth, health status, or educational 
achievement. Linking these outcomes directly to spending 
decisions is impossible.  For example, health status has 
improved each year since the establishment of the NHS, but 
this reflects economic and social progress as well as 
medical practice, and also public spending on housing, 
education, etc. The Scottish experience is similar to 
Whitehall, where, in practice, negotiation over targets is an 
ongoing process of refinement between Treasury and 
Departments, and only a minority of targets are dependent 
on new resources from Spending Reviews. 
 
The New Efficiency Targets 
In June 2004, the Executive announced its intention to seek 
savings in the Scottish Budget – which would release 
resources for spending on priorities, in an initiative entitled 
'Efficient Government'. The target was savings of £500m 
over the Spending Review period to 2007-08, rising to 
£1billion by 2010. 
 
A few weeks later, the Chancellor announced a similar 
efficiency drive across Whitehall, on the basis of a report by 
Sir Peter Gershon (Gershon, 2004). The objective was also 
to release resources for use in front line services, with a 
target of £20billion by 2007-08, of which at least 60% (or 
£12billion) would be cash-releasing. 
 
This report did not apply directly to the Scottish Executive, 
although the review team did share its proposals with the 
devolved administrations, and reported that the Executive 
was seeking annual efficiency gains 'as ambitious as those 
in England'.  Moreover, the areas identified as appropriate 
for efficiency gains in Scotland are identical to Gershon, 
namely procurement; back-office reform; transactional 
services, productive time; and policy, funding and regulatory 
regimes.  The Finance Minister stated the Scottish target 
would be achievable without job loss (Kerr, 2004); and the 
First Minister later asserted that Scotland would “go further” 
than Whitehall (Blitz and Nicholson, 2004).  Mr. McConnell 
is also reported as saying that the savings will be 2% per 
annum, compared with 1.5% per annum in cash in 
Whitehall.  This efficiency drive was viewed as a central 
plank of the refreshed Framework for Economic 
Development in Scotland (FEDS), as the mechanism for 
increasing public sector productivity.  Ironically, of course, 
simply redistributing finance from administration to service 
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delivery would increase output, but not be recorded as 
growth in the current national accounts model applying in 
Scotland. 
 
The basis of this comparison, however, is unclear.  Although 
the First Minister is reported as seeking 2% per annum, the 
Finance Minister’s figure was 2% by 2007-8. Therefore, this 
would compare poorly with the 4.5% set for Whitehall. This 
led to persistent questioning of the Executive’s plans by the 
press and Parliament, over both the scale of the targets and 
the implications for jobs.  By December 2004, the 
Executive’s target for 2007-8 was raised three times, to 
£650m, then £745m, and potentially to £900m. 
 
The picture was further confused by the announcement in 
November by the new Finance Minister that the savings 
package would amount to £1.7 billion over the next three 
years (Barnes, 2004). This figure was inflated by counting 
the savings delivered in 2005-6 of £405m three times as 
these are recurring – giving a figure of £1,215m; a further 
£177m in 2006-7 counted again for 2007-8 thereby adding 
£354m; and a further £163m for 2007-8 making a 
cumulative total of £1,732m, which the Executive then 
converted to a percentage figure of 8.3% of 2004-5 
spending – i.e. using three years savings as a percentage of 
a single year – which is arithmetically correct, but 
meaningless in terms of budget management. What 
matters is the percentage of recurrent funding available for 
redistribution in the budget, which is £745m or 2.9% of the 
2007-8 Departmental Expenditure Limit. 
 
On past experience, savings of 1% per annum should be 
deliverable.  However, around £325m of this is attributed to 
local government which in the recent cuts exercises has 
made such savings through a combination of reductions and 
council tax increases. 
 
In short, the Executive has set modest and deliverable 
efficiency targets, some of which would have materialised in 
the normal process of financial management - which will 
release limited but useful resources for service 
improvement. Good managers in the public sector would 
have been pursuing such efficiency gains – by improving the 
ratio of outputs to inputs – as part of their ongoing approach 
to budget management.  In an era of post-ideological 
politics, politicians are keen to claim greater financial 
competence over their opponents. 
 
The Executive has recently produced its efficiency technical 
notes but these are subject to review following advice from 
Audit Scotland.  It has, however, produced a list of budget 
line items identifying broadly how the savings will 
materialise.  This preliminary summary suggests that a 
wider range of efficiency savings is under consideration than 
the original categories defined as efficient government.  Of 
these, procurement is the most prevalent, accounting for 
£207m of the £650m identified in the DEL.  There are only a 
few examples of potential back-office savings.  Of particular 
concern is the £67m identified as savings in the Supporting 
People programme and the Modernising Government and 
Efficient Government Funds.  This will require careful 
appraisal to ensure these are genuine efficiency gains which 
improve the ratio of outputs to resource inputs, rather than 
simply programme underspends.  Similarly, a number of 
items are simply called 'efficiency savings' with no indication 
of how these will be delivered.   The politics of efficiency 
remain important in the tightly controlled public expenditure 
regime in Whitehall, particularly for the message the 
Executive’s performance sends out to the Treasury. 
 
Conclusion 
The publication of the Scottish Budget in 2004 marked 
continuing progress in the development of performance 
reporting.  The new targets are fewer in number, with a 
greater emphasis on output and outcome measures than 
previously.  However, substantial problems of linking 
budgets to results remain. 
 
The introduction of efficiency targets has potential to bring 
greater transparency to government spending, but 
exaggerating the targets led to some press, public and 
political scepticism over the process. Spending public 
money well is a key task of government, which requires 
serious consideration, particularly for Scotland, given the 
widespread scepticism elsewhere in the UK that the Barnett 
formula operates to our advantage.  Technical problems of 
measuring performance and efficiency are such that whilst 
indicators can inform the process, in the final analysis, they 
simply assist political judgements.  Performance 
management is not rocket science. 
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Appendix I: Objectives and Targets Relating to Economic Growth 
 
1. Tourism, Culture and Sport Portfolio 
 
Objective: To generate jobs and wealth for Scotland by promoting and developing the creative industries. 
Target: Year on year real terms increase of Scottish Creative Industries Gross Value Added (GVA) to end 2007. 
2. Enterprise and Lifelong Learning Portfolio 
 
Objective: To raise the long-term sustainable growth rate of the Scottish economy. 
Targets: 
- “Increase business investment in research and development compared to OECD competitors”; 
 
- Improve productivity levels in Scottish industry; 
 
- Increase entrepreneurial activity in Scotland over time. 
 
3. Transport Portfolio 
 
To promote economic growth by building, enhancing, managing and maintaining transport services, infrastructure and 
networks to maximise their efficiency. 
 
Targets: 
 
- Increase passenger journeys on the Scottish Rail network by an average of 2% each year; 
 
- Reduce the time taken to undertake trunk road journeys on congested or heavily trafficked sections of the network 
by 2008; 
 
- Improve the condition of the trunk road network over a 10 year period against measurable milestones; 
 
- Achieve key milestones each year on the delivery of the infrastructure projects set out in the long-term investment 
plan, subject to projects receiving the necessary public or parliamentary approval. 
 
4. Environmental and Rural Development Portfolio 
 
Objective: Promotion of sustainable growth in the rural economy and sustainable rural communities by supporting the 
agriculture, food and forestry sectors, pursuing land reform and improving rural services. 
 
Targets: 
 
- Maintaining at least 95% of agricultural land in the Scottish LFA in productive use over the Spending Review 
period, except where that land is converted to other sustainable uses; 
 
- By March 2008, improve service delivery in rural areas so that agreed improvements in accessibility and quality 
are achieved for key services in remote and disadvantaged areas. 
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Appendix II: Efficient Government Cash-Releasing Projects by Portfolio 
 
 Portfolio 
 
Communities 
Amount (£m) 
C/C1 Reducing unit costs in Communities Scotland Development Programme 9 
 Total 9 
 
 
COPFS/C1 
 
Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
Alternatives to prosecution 
 
 
1.1 
COPFS/C2 Case related costs/rationalisation of estate 0.5 
COPFS/C3 Increase Sheriffs solemn sentencing power to 5 years 0.4 
COPFS/C4 Staff savings from introduction of new IT system in COPFS 0.8 
 Total 2.8 
 
 
CYP/C1 
 
Education  and Young People 
SQA efficiency gains 
 
 
1 
EYP/C2 Care Commission Efficiency Savings 1 
 Education and Young People Portfolio Efficiency Saving 9.8 
EYP/C3 NED Broadband 0.8 
EYP/C4 Pupil Support and Inclusion 0.2 
EYP/C5 Additional Support Needs 1.4 
EYP/C6 Children and Families 3.4 
EYP/C7 Youth Crime 3.1 
EYP/C8 Looked After Children and Youth 0.5 
EYP/C9 Information and Analysis 0.1 
EYP/C10 Gaelic 0.2 
EYP/C11 Other 0.1 
 Total 11.8 
 
 
ELL/C1 
 
Enterprise and Lifelong Learning 
Scottish Enterprise savings 
 
 
5.3 
 Total 5.3 
 
 
ERD/C1 
 
Environment and Rural Development 
Efficiency savings in Forestry Commission (Scotland) 
 
 
1 
ERD/C2 
ERD/C3 
Savings in SEPA 
Savings in SNH 
Total 
4 
 
5 
 
 
Finance and Public Services Reform  
 
 
Central Government 
Miscellaneous Others 
 
 
0.1 
FPSR-C/C1 Standards Commission 0.016 
FPSR-C/C2 Inspectorate of Prosecution 0.08 
FPSR-C/C3 Internal efficiency savings in SPPA 0.635 
 Total 0.735 
 
 
FPSR-LG/C1 
 
Local Government 
Assumed Local Government Efficiency Savings 
 
 
168.3 
FPSR-LG/C2 Fire Service Reform 1.5 
FPSR-LG/C3 Common Police Services 8 
FPSR-LG/C4 Efficiencies in Supporting People programme 27 
FPSR-LG/C5 Modernising Government and Efficient Government Fund Efficiency Savings 40 
 Total 244.8 
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H/C1 
Health 
NHS Procurement 
 
 
50 
H/C2 NHS Support Service Reform 10 
H/C3 NHS Logistics Reform 10 
H/C4 Improved prescribing of drugs 20 
H/C5 Preventing inappropriate hospital admissions 25 
H/C6 National benchmarking exercise on use of staff 10 
H/C7 NHS Efficiency savings 40 
H/C8 Estate and facilities management 1 
 Total 166 
 
 
J/C1 
 
Justice 
Fire Central Government 
 
 
0.1 
J/C2 Community Justice Services 4 
J/C3 Scottish Court Service 3 
J/C4 Legal  Aid – changes in rules and increased efficiency 12 
J/C5 Efficiency savings in SPS 10 
J/C6 Accountant in Bankruptcy – take more  cases  in house 1 
 Total 30.1 
 
 
TCS/C1 
 
Tourism, Culture and Sport 
Efficiency savings from Tourism, Culture and Sport NDPBs 
 
 
1.75 
 Total 1.75 
 
 
T/C1 
 
Transport 
Rail Franchise – Procurement 
 
 
5 
T/C2 Concessionary Fares 5 
T/C3 Rail Franchise – Introduction of ticket machines 1.5 
T/C4 Traveline/Transport Direct 1 
T/C5 Highlands and Islands Airport Limited 0.5 
T/C6 Caledonian MacBrayne 0.5 
 Total 13.5 
 
 
A/C1 
 
Administration* 
CAP Reform 
 
 
2.4 
A/C2 Procurement 2.4 
A/C3 e-HR 0.5 
A/C4 eRDM 0.5 
A/C5 Savings from non-staff costs/better staff deployment 2 
 Total 8.4 
 
 
O/C1 
 
Other 
Procurement 
 
 
150 
O/C2 Scottish Water savings 95 
 Total 245 
 
 
Overall Total 
 
744.185 
 
 
Author's Note: 
 
*Totals do not add up to £8.4m. 
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